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WESTERN OPPORTUNITIES FOR INVESTMENT IN




As recently as 1988, the Soviet Union produced 20.6 % of total world
oil output, making it the world's largest oil producer.' In that same
year, exports of both oil and gas accounted for eighty percent of the
Soviet Union's hard currency exports to the West.2 With a reported ten
percent decline in gross national product for the first half of 1991,3 the
Soviets desperately need hard currency to strengthen their collapsing
economy.4 Unfortunately, the percentage of hard currency obtained
from oil exports to the West has also sharply declined. 5 Soviet oil pro-
* This Comment addresses Western business opportunities in the oil industry of the
former Soviet Union. While recent political events have shifted power from Moscow to
the governments of the newly independent states, many of the problems that hindered
Western investment in the Soviet oil industry prior to the dissolution of the Soviet
Union persist today. For example, the "war of laws" that once existed between
republican and Soviet authorities endures between the members of the Commonwealth
of Independent States and local regions within these member-states, both of which are
vying for control of mineral rich areas. Moreover, many of the operational and
financial concerns addressed in this Comment, such as registration, procurement of
supplies, transfer of technology, protection of intellectual property, labor, taxes and
currency, continue to raise barriers to investment. Thus, the issues and conclusions
presented remain both timely and valid.
** J.D./M.A. Candidate, 1994, Washington College of Law and School of Interna-
tional Service, The American University.
1. Moe, The Future of Soviet Oil Supplies to the West, SOVIET GEOGRAPHY, Mar.
1991, at 137, 137 [hereinafter The Future of Soviet Oil].
2. Natural Resources, DOING Bus. IN E. EUROPE, Nov. 1, 1989, 56, 57 (LEXIS,
Nexis Library, Bus. File).
3. Boulton, Soviet GNP Falls By 10% In First Half, Fin. Times, July 18, 1991, at
1.
4. Goldman, The Catastrophe of the Soviet Economy, INT'L ECON., Aug.-Sept.
1990, at 54, 57 [hereinafter Catastrophe of the Soviet Economy]. See ECONOMIIST IN-
TELLIGENCE UNIT COUNTRY REPORT, No. 2, QUARTERLY REPORT ON THE SovIET
UNION FOR 1991 32 (1991) [hereinafter EIU REPORT ON THE SOVIET UNION] (noting
that the 45.1 percent drop in imports for the first quarter of 1991 as compared with the
first quarter of 1990 is particularly indicative of the need for hard currency).
5. See EIU REPORT ON THE SOVIET UNION, supra note 4, at 27 (reporting a 9
percent drop in Soviet oil and gas production in the first quarter of 1991 relative to
production in the first quarter of 1990); see also Kovski, Soviet Potential Lingers De-
spite Current Upheaval, OIL & MONEY INT'L, May 13, 1991, at 1 (reporting that
Soviet officials expect a 50 percent decline in oil exports in 1991). But see Lelyveld, Oil
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duction dropped from 12.48 million barrels per day in 1987,1 to less
than ten million barrels per day in December 1991.7 Likewise, oil ex-
ports declined by thirty-three percent in 1991.8 This drop in production
resulted from, among other causes,9 increased production costs, 10 dete-
riorating equipment," a failing infrastructure,"2 ethnic strife,' 3 and
Exports May Finance Import Rise for USSR, J. OF COMMERCE, Aug. 6, 1991, at 1
[hereinafter Oil Exports May Finance Import Rise] (declaring that Soviet oil exports
for the first half of 1991 actually fell only 25 percent compared to the first half of
1990, rather than the 50 percent drop reported by Soviet officials). This miscalculation
on the part of Soviet officials is blamed, in part, on recent shifts in control over Soviet
oil production. Id. Once the exclusive domain of the Soviet oil ministry, control of oil
production is now shared with the various republics. Id. Nevertheless, this 25 percent
decline in oil exports is a dramatic acceleration from the 12 percent decline exper-
ienced in 1989. The Catastrophe of the Soviet Economy, supra note 4, at 57.
6. 20,000 Soviet Wells Reported to be Idle, OIL & GAS J., July 29, 1991, at 38
[hereinafter 20,000 Soviet Wells].
7. Strauss, Major Shifts in Oil Market Could Create More Stability, J. OF COM-
MERCE, Dec. 31, 1991, at 4B. See Soviet Flow Skids to Less Than 10 Million Bid, OIL
& GAS J., Dec. 30, 1991, at 24 (citing several reasons for the sharp decline in oil
production, including the sharp decline in drilling volume, insufficient financing, lack of
equipment, and the diminution in the quality of reserves); see also Trouble in Barrels,
THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 21, 1991, at 84 [hereinafter Trouble in Barrels] (predicting that
the energy output of the Soviet Union will decline by an additional one to two million
barrels per day in 1992).
8. Tanner, Former Soviet Union's Oil Woes Unlikely to Hurt Exports as Much as
Expected, Wall. St. J., Jan. 9, 1992, at A2. See Oil Exports May Finance Import
Rise, supra note 5, at I (reporting a 50 percent drop in oil exports for the first half of
1991); see also The Domestic Economy, EIU REPORT ON THE SOVIET UNION, supra
note 4, at 27 (stating that oil production for the first quarter of 1991 was the lowest
quarterly output in fifteen years).
9. See 20,000 Soviet Wells, supra note 6, at 38 (asserting that the drop in oil
production is a product of the Soviet government's recent emphasis on consumer goods
manufacturing rather than energy production); see also Russia: Gasping for Breath,
Choking in Waste, Dying Young, Wash. Post, Aug. 18, 1991, at C3 (reporting that
millions of barrels of petroleum are lost each year in the Soviet Union because of acci-
dents that occur during the extraction and transportation of oil).
10. See The Future of Soviet Oil, supra note 1, at 145 (stating that increases in
the costs of production result from the unfavorable location and complexity of fields
currently being exploited).
11. See Ebel, Can Soviet Oil Save Gorbachev?, INT'L EcON., Oct.-Nov. 1990, at
45, 46 [hereinafter Can Soviet Oil Save Gorbachev?] (explaining that wells stand idle
because of poor construction, infrequent inspections, and shortages of spare parts); see
also 20,000 Soviet Wells, supra note 6, at 38 (discussing a Scottish report on the
Soviet oil and gas industry that estimates that 20,000 productive Soviet wells arc idle
due to lack of equipment or unreliable equipment).
12. See Catastrophe of the Soviet Economy, supra note 4, at 57 (stating that the
failure to provide much needed repairs to the Soviet railroad seriously endangers con-
tinued oil production).
13. See Can Soviet Oil Save Gorbachev?, supra note 11, at 46 (stating that ethnic
unrest in the Armenian capital of Baku, the nation's center for the manufacture of oil
field equipment, disrupted oil production).
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outdated technology. 4 Thus, commentators have recognized that the
Soviet Union's future ability to increase oil exports to the West, and to
generate the needed influx of hard currency,'5 requires drastic reform
of the country's oil industry.1 6 One such avenue of reform is the estab-
lishment of joint projects with Western companies in order to enhance
the development of the Soviet Union's oil reserves.1"
Foreign companies appear eager to invest in the oil industry of the
Soviet Union because of the potential for reaping enormous profits. 18
First, the Soviet Union may possess the world's largest oil reserves."
Secondly, because the Soviets have confirmed the existence of oil, for-
eign oil investors20 avoid the usual exploration costs. 21 Thus, Western
14. See Sausbury, U.S. Expertise Tops Soviet Union's Energy Shopping List, J. OF
COMMERCE & COMMERCIAL, Aug. 8, 1991, at 7B (hereinafter Soviet Energy Shopping
List] (reporting that Soviet energy officials hope that United States removal of trade
barriers will provide greater Soviet access to new energy production technologies).
15. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text (explaining the predominate role
oil exports play in the Soviet Union's hard currency earning potential); see also EIU
REPORT ON THE SOVIET UNION, supra note 4, at 32 (reporting that for the first quarter
of 1991, exports to the developed West from which hard currency could be derived fell
by 10.7 percent); The Future of Soviet Oil, supra note 1, at 138 (asserting that the
volume and value of oil that the Soviet Union exports is the single most important
determinant of the country's ability to participate in the international economy); Note,
The New Soviet Joint Venture Law: Analysis, Issues, and Approaches for the Ameri-
can Investor, 19 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 851, 856-60 (1987) [hereinafter Note, The
New Soviet Joint Venture Law] (contending that, through the establishment of joint
ventures with American businesses, the Soviet Union hopes to encourage the United
States to abandon its persistent opposition to Soviet accession to the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade).
16. See T. GUSTAFSON, CRISIS AMID PLENTY: THE POLITICS OF SOVIET ENERGY
UNDER BREZHNEV AND GORBACHEV 334-35 (1989) (asserting that reform of the en-
ergy sector should be one of the least controversial tasks of Soviet officials during the
present period of political transformation). Gustafson argues that the relatively modest
technological demands of oil production make it possible for the Soviet Union to rap-
idly become a major world player in the world's energy markets. Id. at 334. Addition-
ally, because oil production is fueled by large, capital-intensive entities, there is little
chance that local communities will attempt to interfere with production operations. Id.
at 335. Finally, expansion of the energy sector is compatible with Gorbachev's reform
schemes and will become more efficient as other areas of the economy develop. Id.
17. See Note, The New Soviet Joint Venture Law, supra note 15, at 851-52 (dis-
cussing efforts by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), the Soviet Cen-
tral Committee, and Soviet officials to establish joint enterprises with Western
businesses).
18. See Potts, Clearing Brush on the Soviet Oil Frontier, Wash. Post, Feb. 10,
1991, at HI [hereinafter Clearing Brush on the Soviet Oil Frontier] (reporting that
despite the political uncertainty within the Soviet Union, Western oil companies are
willing to invest billions of dollars in the Soviet oil industry in return for economic
rights in up to half of all the oil produced).
19. See id. (stating that the Soviet Union possesses twice the amount of known oil
reserves held by the United States and possibly more than Saudi Arabia).
20. See id. (citing Total Petroleum of France and the American White Nights ven-
ture, made up of Phibro Energy Inc. and Anglo Suisse, as two Western oil companies
1992]
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companies can anticipate producing large quantities of oil at low costs,
thereby reaping immense and immediate returns on their investment. 22
However, the small number of currently operating oil projects23 has
encountered prohibitive obstacles in establishing joint enterprises. Polit-
ical obstacles, such as the struggle between republican officials, as well
as regional and local officials, over ownership and control of oil located
on their respective territories discourage many would-be investors.24 In
addition, not all Soviets look favorably upon Western assistance in the
development of the Soviet oil industry.2 5 Many criticize what they con-
which are scheduled to begin oil production in the Soviet Union in 1991); see also
Canadian, U.S. Firms Form Soviet Ventures, OIL & GAS J., July 29, 1991, at 40
(reporting that PanCanadian Petroleum Ltd. and Canadian Fracmaster Ltd. estab-
lished a joint oil production venture operating in Siberia) [hereinafter Canadian, U.S.
Firms].
21. Clearing Brush on the Soviet Oil Frontier, supra note 18, at HI.
22. See id. (explaining that companies will save billions of dollars and years of time
by avoiding the exploration and development operations that typically precede petro-
leum production).
23. See Soviet Tax Maze Latest Source of Investor Anxiety, Petroleum Intelli-
gence Wkly., Apr. 22, 1991, at 8 (reporting that the only foreign companies currently
producing Soviet oil are Phibro and Anglo Suisse of the United States through the
White Nights joint venture, and Royal Dutch-Shell and Fracmaster of Canada through
the Uganskfracmaster joint venture) [hereinafter Soviet Tax Maze]; see also Cana-
dian, U.S. Firms, supra note 20, at 40 (reporting two new Soviet joint ventures in
Siberia, one with Canada's PanCanadian Petroleum Ltd. and the other with Fairfield
Industries Inc. of Houston); U.S. Delegation to Visit Soviet Union to Clear Hurdles to
Oil Exploration, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 26, at 977, 977 (June 26, 1991) (recit-
ing an estimate by the Department of Commerce that ten to twenty Western oil com-
panies are currently negotiating with Soviet authorities for potential oil production)
[hereinafter U.S. Delegation to Visit Soviet Union]; Rich Soviet Promise Keeps For-
eign Firms on Investment Track, Petroleum Intelligence Wkly., Jan. 28, 1991, at 3, 3-4
(stating that the Total Company of France hopes to be producing by end of 1991, and
that France is planning seven more joint-venture agreements to be signed by the middle
of that same year.
24. Trouble in Barrels, supra note 7, at 84; see Medvedev, Yeltsin and His 'Little'
Russia; Why Is Moscow Cheering a Historic Loss?, Wash. Post, Jan. 12, 1992, at C l,
C2 (arguing that granting autonomy to Chechen-Irquish with its large oil refinery com-
plex, or to Bashkiria and Tatarstan, the main centers for the petro-chemical industry of
the former Soviet Union, all three of which are located in the Russian republic,
threaten the very creation of a market economy in the Commonwealth) [hereinafter
Yeltsin's Little Russia]; U.S. Delegation to Visit Soviet Union, supra note 23, at 977
(reporting that Eugene McAllister, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Bus-
iness Affairs, believes that until the Soviet Union and its constituent republics reach an
agreement on the ownership of oil, foreign companies will be reluctant to invest in
Soviet joint ventures); see also U.S. Joint Ventures and the Soviet Energy Crisis So-
VIET OBSERVER, Apr. 1991, at 1, 8 (stating that the United States Department of State
is hoping for an "all-Union treaty" defining ownership and property rights between the
republics and the central government) [hereinafter U.S. Joint Ventures].
25. See Soviet Oil Industry Woes May Extend Crisis, OIL & GAS J., June 3, 1991,
at 65 (noting that hard-line Communist newspapers and Soviet officials expressed their
opposition to the influx of Western capital to the Soviet Union) [hereinafter Soviet Oil
Industry Woes].
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sider to be the "capitalist exploitation" of the nation's oil,20 while
others find it unconscionable to permit exports of Soviet oil when do-
mestic energy supplies are low.2"
Legal obstacles also encumber potential investment. Frequent
changes and amendments to joint venture legislation,2 8 as well as the
ambiguous nature of existing Soviet laws,2 unnerve potential investors.
In addition, Soviet legislation fails to address many relevant issues re-
lating to foreign investment, 30 such as procurement arrangements and
repatriation of profits.
This Comment examines Soviet legislation relevant to foreign invest-
ment in the Soviet oil industry. Part I examines the possible legal
frameworks upon which investment can be based. Part II discusses the
problems associated with assertions of autonomy at the union and re-
publican levels, and legislation regarding resource ownership. Part III
addresses operational concerns facing potential oil investors. Part IV
looks at financial concerns, namely Soviet taxes and currency issues.
Part V examines recent political developments and their impact on
Western investment in the Soviet oil industry. The Comment concludes
by advising Western companies, Western governments, and the Union
26. Id.
27. The Future of Soviet Oil, supra note 1, at 156. Much of the opposition to oil
exports stems from the fact that local communities see little direct benefit from the
exports. Id. at 157. Therefore, commentators suggest that Western investors work to
secure some direct benefits for the local population as well as demonstrating concern
for the environment. Id.
28. See Soviet Tax Maze, supra note 23, at 3 (predicting that repealed alterations
in Soviet export tax will deter potential foreign investors). But see Saliman, An Analy-
sis of the Changing Legal Environment in the USSR for Foreign Investment. 22 LAw
& POL'Y INVT'L Bus. 1, 3 (1991) (stating that Decree 49, the joint venture decree, has
been amended several times to clarify textual ambiguities and thus attract foreign in-
vestment) [hereinafter Changing Legal Environment in the USSR].
29. See Changing Legal Environment in the USSR, supra note 28, at 5 (attribut-
ing the ambiguity of Soviet legislation to the ideological and practical constraints
placed on Soviet lawmakers). Saliman cites two reasons why adopting capitalist princi-
ples must be subtle and gradual. Id. at 6. First, many planners still cling to Marxist-
Leninist principles. Id. Second, on a practical level, planners, managers, and lawyers
lack the experience with and understanding of Western economic systems. Id.
30. See U.S. Joint Ventures, supra note 24, at 8 (discussing the absence of legisla-
tion defining the economic relationship between Moscow and the republics); see also
U.S. Delegation to Visit Soviet Union, supra note 23, at 977 (stating the hope that an
arrangement will be established so that foreign investment can proceed while legisla-
tion concerning the ownership of natural resources between the central government and
the republics is still being formulated); Note, A New Era for Foreign Investment in the
U.S.S.R., 1 SoviET & E. EUR. L. 1, 11 (Nov. 1990) (declaring that although the
presidential Decree on Foreign Investment in the Soviet Union of October 1990 per-
mits the establishment of 100 percent foreign investment enterprises, the rules and pro-
cedures governing the operation of these enterprises have not yet been written) [herein-
after A New Era for Foreign Investment].
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and republican governments of the Soviet Union to take bold steps to
facilitate increased Western investment in the nation's oil industry.
I. LEGAL FRAMEWORKS
For the interested Westerner, investing in the Soviet oil industry
presents many challenges. Of primary importance is the task of select-
ing the type of agreement around which the partnership shall be
formed."' Although foreign investment in Soviet oil can be structured
many ways, some of which will be discussed below, the joint venture 2
is most common. 33
A. JOINT VENTURES
Even before the Gorbachev era, Soviet laws permitted joint ven-
tures.34 In order to adapt to a radically changing political and economic
environment, however, Soviet joint ventures were reactivated and their
scope broadened.35 With the advent of the Joint Venture Decree of
31. See Hazard, Comment, 1 SOVIET & E. EUR. L. 5 (May 1990) (commenting on
a debate that ensued at a conference in April 1990 between Soviet jurists and Italian
advisors, at which the Soviets favored detailed provisions for each type of company and
association versus a general rule covering all types of business organizations).
32. See Recent Developments, Foreign Investment: New Soviet Joint Venture Law,
28 HARV. INT'L L.J. 473, 473 n.2 (1987) (defining joint venture as "an arrangement in
which two economic enterprises create a new entity to undertake joint production, mar-
keting, or other activities") [hereinafter New Soviet Joint Venture Law].
33. See Gochenour, Soviet Efforts to Attract Foreign E & P Investment Through
Joint Ventures, in SOCIETY OF PETROLEUM ENGINEERS, WORKING PAPER No. 22032
175, 178 (1991) (arguing that joint venture laws, because of the way they have been
enacted and amended, are ill-suited for the oil and gas industry) [hereinafter Soviet
Efforts to Attract Foreign E & P Investment]; see also Bazyler, Making Profits From
Perestroika: Soviet Economic Reform and New Trade Opportunities in the Gorbachev
Era, I 1 WHITTIER L. REV. 323, 329 (1989) (describing the Soviet preference for joint
ventures and listing the benefits for the Soviets upon the formation of joint ventures)
[hereinafter Making Profits From Perestroika].
34. See M. BOGUSLAVSKY & P. SMIRNOV, THE REORGANIZATION OF SOVIET FOR-
EIGN TRADE: LEGAL ASPECTS 81 (1989) (explaining that Soviet organizations have
participated in joint ventures since the 1920s); see also New Soviet Joint Venture Law,
supra note 32, at 473 (stating that the Soviets canceled all joint ventures in 1930).
Although joint ventures were rejected as ideologically unacceptable, foreign investment
nonetheless took place in the Soviet Union through Industrial Cooperation Agreements
(ICAs). Id. These ICA enterprises included Pepsi-Cola and Occidental Petroleum. Id.
at 474.
35. M. BOGUSLAVSKY & P. SMIRNOV, supra note 34, at 81.
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1987,38 Western enthusiasm about investment in Soviet enterprises
burgeoned.37
The 1987 Joint Venture Decree, while evidence of a major advance
in Soviet economic and legal development, created numerous disincen-
tives for the potential Western investor. 38 Two provisions mandated the
predominate role of the Soviet partner. First, the Soviet partner had to
own at least a fifty-one percent share in the charter capital of the joint
enterprise.3 9 Second, both the Chairman of the Board and the Director-
General, the two top management positions of the joint venture, were
required to be citizens of the U.S.S.R.' °
The 1987 law also imposed heavy taxes on the joint venture, particu-
larly the foreign partner.," After the first two years of profitable opera-
tion, the joint venture was subject to a thirty percent profit tax."2 A
forty percent export tax served as a major disincentive for Western oil
companies who planned to sell their share of oil production on the in-
36. Decree of the USSR Council of Ministers on the Establishment in the Terri-
tory of the USSR and Operation of Joint Ventures with the Participation of Soviet
Organizations and Firms from Capitalist and Developing Countries (13 January 1987,
No. 49, as amended by Decrees No. 352 on March 17, 1988 and No. 385 on May 6.
1989),, SP SSSR No. 49 (1987), reprinted in 2 PARKER SCH. FOREIGN & Cotp. L.,
USSR Legal Materials I (V. Pechota & P. Pettibone) [hereinafter DECREE 49]. See
New Soviet Joint Venture Law, supra note 32, at 478-79 (contending that the Sovietjoint venture Edict is a product of changes in Soviet objectives and was enacted with
the intention of abandoning old Soviet attitudes to foreign economic activity, advancing
industrial modernization, and supplying hard currency to the Soviet economy). These
goals are typical of East European joint venture laws as stated by the Rumanian joint
venture law which includes similar objectives. Id. The Rumanian law promotes the
objectives of modernization of industry, diversification of exports, introduction of new
technology, improvement of the technical quality of goods and services, advancement of
research, and the introduction of modern managerial methods. Id. at 478 n.60.
37. See Potter, Ouster May Chill Western Investments, Wash. Post, Aug. 20, 1991,
at Cl (stating that there are approximately 2,000 Soviet joint ventures with Western
firms, totaling S 3.2 billion). Of the 2,000 Soviet joint ventures, United States compa-
nies are involved in only approximately 12%. Id.
38. See Weizman, Western Business Opportunities in the Soviet Union: Per-
estroikan Prospects, 15 N.C.J. INT'L L. & Cost. REG. 171, 172 (1990) (asserting that
the 1987 joint venture law indicated a shift in the Soviet Union's policy toward foreign
trade) [hereinafter Western Business Opportunities].
39. DECREE 49, supra note 36, at art. II, § 5.
40. DECREE 49, supra note 36, at art. III, § 21.
41. See Western Business Opportunities, supra note 38, at 195 (explaining the tax
structure of the Soviet Union). Prior to 1978, the Soviet Union generally did not tax
foreign entities. Id. Under Decree 313, adopted in 1978 by the Ministry of Finance,
foreign legal entities were subjected to a 40 percent tax on income derived from eco-
nomic activity in the Soviet Union. Id.
42. See M. BOGUSLAVSKY & P. SMnINOV, supra note 34, at 101 (explaining that a
30 percent tax was to be taken from that portion of profits remaining after payments
had been made to the reserve and development funds).
1992]
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ternational market.48 In addition, the Soviets imposed a twenty percent
tax on the Western partner's share of profits upon repatriation." While
the Soviets enacted this provision with the hope of stimulating reinvest-
ment of Western profits back into their failing economy, it soon became
apparent that this tax measure caused many potential foreign investors
to delay their investment plans and await new, more favorable tax
provisions. 5
Due to worsening economic conditions46 and the acknowledgment
that foreign participation was needed to revitalize the economy,41 the
Soviets amended their joint venture laws on March 17, 1988 and again
on May 6, 1989. These amendments created more favorable conditions
for potential Western investment.' 8 For example, Soviet partners are no
longer required to hold a majority share in the charter capital of the
joint enterprise. Instead, the parties determine by agreement the per-
centage of charter capital owned by the foreign participant.' 9 As a fur-
ther concession to Western businesses, a foreign citizen may now hold a
position in the enterprise as either the Chairman of the Board or the
Director-General, provided a Soviet citizen holds at least one of these
positions.50
43. See Burt, Soviet Ventures Require Careful Structuring, OIL & GAS J., June 3,
1991 at 78, 80 (remarking that Soviet export taxes have frustrated many potential
Western investors whose returns depend on the export of oil) [hereinafter Soviet
Ventures].
44. DECREE 49, supra note 36, at art. IV, § 41.
45. See Why Soviet Oil Wells Won't Be Gushing Soon, Bus. WEEK, Sept. 9,1991,
at 38 (asserting that Western oil companies will remain hesitant to make huge invest-
ments until the Soviet laws regarding the repatriation of profits are resolved by the
central and republican governments) [hereinafter Why Soviet Oil Wells Won't Be
Gushing Soon].
46. See Halkias, U.S., Soviets Talking About Joint Oil Ventures, J. OF COMMERCE
& COMMERCIAL, July 19, 1991, at 6B (asserting that, beginning in 1988, Soviet oil
production began falling at a rate of two million barrels per day).
47. See Changing Legal Environment in the USSR, supra note 28, at 3 (stating
that Decree 49 has been amended several times, in part to create a more favorable
climate for the foreign investor).
48. See DECREE 49, supra note 36 (explaining that the intent of the Decree was to
further develop international trade and cooperation with capitalist and developing
countries); see also Soviet Efforts to Attract Foreign E & P Investment, supra note 33,
at 179 (stating that more than a few Soviets criticize the joint venture law for being
too favorable to the foreign partner).
49. DECREE 49, supra note 36, at art. II, § 5; see Western Business Opportunities,
supra note 38, at 181 (determining that this amendment permits foreign participants to
own up to 99 percent of the shares in the joint venture).
50. DECREE 49, supra note 36, at art. III, § 21.
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The amendments also created more favorable tax provisions for the
Western partner.5 While tax on a foreigner's repatriated profits re-
mains twenty percent, 52 a new provision authorizes the U.S.S.R. Minis-
try of Finances to reduce the tax, or completely exempt the foreign
participant from the tax for a specified period. 3 In addition, a new
provision modifies the two year tax exemption on profits of the joint
enterprise.54 Under previous law, a joint venture was exempt from
profit tax during the first two years of operation. 5 With the amended
joint venture law, the two-year exemption activates at the moment of
declared profits.56
Another question arises in valuation of the capital contribution of
each partner. In joint ventures for the production of oil, the Soviet
partner normally provides buildings, employees, 7 and proven oil
reserves, 58 while the Western partner supplies modern equipment, ad-
vanced technology, and managerial skills."' Determining the value of
intangible assets such as managerial skills and technology, creates diffi-
culties.60 In addition, because the ruble is not a convertible currency,
reaching an agreement on the value of even tangible capital contribu-
51. See Soviet Tax Maze, supra note 23, at 3 (contending that changes in Soviet
tax legislation, although beneficial, could prove unnerving if viewed by the potential
investor as one more example of the constant flux in Soviet business law).
52. DECREE 49, supra note 36, art. VI, § 41.
53. Id.
54. DECREE 49, supra note 36, at art. IV, § 36.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. See Soviet Efforts to Attract Foreign E & P Investment, supra note 33, at 179
(stating that republican associations joining joint ventures have demanded that all asso-
ciation employees be employed by the joint venture and included as part of the associa-
tion's capital contribution). The author explains that this threatens to perpetuate the
traditional Soviet problem of overstaffing. Id. But see DECREE 49. supra note 36, at art.
II, § 11 (omitting employees from the list of assets that may be contributed to the
charter fund of a joint enterprise).
58. See Procedures for Assessing the Land, Natural Resources. Buildings and
Structures Forming Part of the Soviet Partner's Contribution to the Authorized Capi-
tal of Joint Ventures, of February 4, 1988 (adopted jointly by the USSR State Com-
mittee for Prices, USSR State Planning Committee. Ministry of Finance. Ministry of
Foreign Trade, and USSR State Committee for External Economic Relations), re-
printed in, 2 PARKER SCH. FOREIGN & CoMP. L., USSR Legal Materials 1, art. II (V.
Pechota & P. Pettibone 1991) (asserting that the assessment of minerals made availa-
ble to the joint venture by the Soviet party shall not be included in the fixed assets of
the joint venture) [hereinafter SoviET VENTURES].
59. See New Soviet Joint Venture Law, supra note 32, at 478 (asserting that West-
ern technology and Western managerial skills are required to fulfill the Soviet goal of
industrial modernization).
60. Note, The New Soviet Joint Venture Law, supra note 15, at 865.
19921
AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
tions can be problematic.61 The joint venture law provides little assis-
tance in this regard. 2 The law provides that the Soviet partner's assets
shall be valued in both Soviet and foreign currency, 63 according to con-
tract prices and taking world market prices into account.6 4 The law
further stipulates that the foreign partner's contribution shall be valued
in the same manner and the value shall be converted into rubles ac-
cording to the official exchange rate of the State Bank of the
U.S.S.R.6 5
B. JOINT STOCK COMPANY
Another possible legal framework for foreign investment in the So-
viet oil industry is the joint stock company. A Soviet resolution entitled
Regulation on Joint-Stock Companies and Limited Liability Compa-
nies (Resolution 590), regulates the operation of joint stock companies
in the Soviet Union. 6  This resolution provides for the transformation of
state-owned entities into shareholding corporations very similar to U.S.
corporations.6 7 As of 1991, no foreign-owned joint stock companies
have been established in the geology and energy industries.6 8 Neverthe-
61. Western Business Opportunities, supra note 38, at 190. Due to the fact that
contributions of the Western partner are likely to be valued in foreign currency, the
Western partner in a joint venture is impaired when these contributions are converted
to rubles because the Soviets normally overvalue the ruble. Id. at 190.
62. See DECREE 49, supra note 36, at art. II, § 12 (providing that the Soviet par-
ticipant's contribution to the joint enterprise shall be valued in Soviet and foreign cur-
rency "taking into account world market prices"). To prevent future conflict between
the joint venture partners, it is important that a contract explicitly state the indicia and
valuation standards to be applied in determining market prices. Note, The New Soviet
Joint Venture Law, supra note 15, at 865.
63. See id. (explaining that continual calculations of values and foreign currency
equivalents of costs expended puts an administrative burden on the joint venture).
64. DECREE 49, supra note 38, at art. II, § 12; see also SOVIET VENTURES, supra
note 58, at art. I (stating that where the rights to use natural resources are treated as
part of the Soviet partner's contribution to the authorized capital of the joint venture,
assessment of the value will be carried out by agreement between the partners).
65. DECREE 49, supra note 36, at art. II, § 12; see Western Business Opportunities,
supra note 38, at 190 (explaining that the foreign partner is prejudiced when its contri-
bution is converted to rubles according to the Soviet State Bank's exchange rate be-
cause the Soviets tend to overvalue the ruble when comparing it with convertible cur-
rencies). This conversion results in undervaluing the foreign partner's contribution and
leads to a reduction in profits for the foreign partner. Id.
66. Regulation on Joint-Stock Companies and Limited Liability Companies, SP
SSSR No. 15, item 82 (1990), reprinted in 1 PARKER SCH. FOREIGN & CoMP. L.,
USSR Legal Materials 1 (V. Pechota & P. Pettibone 1991 [hereinafter REGULATION
ON JOINT-STOCK COMPANIES].
67. Butler, Soviet Ventures Require Careful Structuring, OIL & GAS J., June 3,
1991, at 78.
68. See Lomako, The Legal Framework for Oil and Gas Development in the
U.S.S.R., 2 SOVIET & E. EUR. L. 8, 9 (Apr./May 1991) (stating that foreign entities
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less, if a large-scale petroleum entity reorganizes into a joint stock
company, the Soviet state may continue to participate through the own-
ership of equity in the shareholding corporation."9
Lack of uniformity in the laws of the central government and the
Russian republic create uncertainty for Western investors."0 Resolution
59 071 states that the formation of a joint-stock company shall be gov-
erned by the conditions for economic activity established by the legisla-
tion of the Union and the Autonomous Republics.72 Consequently, the
Russian Republic established its own version of Resolution 590 in De-
cember 1990 with the enactment of Regulations on Stock Associa-
tions.73 The Russian law differs from its Soviet counterpart.7 4 It lowers
the start-up charter capital to only 100,000 rubles,78 from 500,000 ru-
bles required under Soviet law.78 In addition, the Russian law requires
only one founder to form the joint stock company,77 as opposed to the
Soviet law which requires two.7 8 Due to the provision in Soviet law
which grants control over the establishment of joint stock companies to
local governments,7 9 companies organized on Russian territory are ad-
have begun purchasing shares issued by Soviet entities in other industries) [hereinafter
Legal Framework for Oil and Gas Development].
69. See id. (stating that existing legislation regards authority over oil and gas to
have been delegated to the central government by the republics); see also Law on Own-
ership in the U.S.S.R. of March 6, 1990, Ved. Verkh. Soy. SSSR No. 11, Item 164,
(1990), reprinted in, 1 PARKER SCH. FOREIGN & Coip. L., USSR Legal Materials 1
(V. Pechota & P. Pettibone 1991) (asserting that the U.S.S.R has "possession and use
of parcels of land and other natural facilities granted in order to ensure the activity of
. . . U.S.S.R. integrated power system").
70. See Frenkel, Soviet and Russian Company Laws: A Comparison, 2 SoviET &
E. EUR. L. 10 (Mar. 1991) (explaining that Soviet and Russian company laws differ in
the corporate forms recognized, the capitalization and formation requirements, and in
governing structures) [hereinafter Soviet and Russian Company Laws).
71. REGULATION ON JOINT-STOCK COMPANIES, supra note 66, at art. I, § 1.
72. Id. This law, however, goes on to point out that conditions with regard to for-
eign participation in a joint stock company shall be governed by the legislative acts of
the republics and the central government. Id. § 2.
73. See Soviet and Russian Company Laws, supra note 70, at 10 (explaining how
Russian law on joint stock companies is more liberal and much more specific than its
Soviet counterpart); see also Patterson, Putting the Laws into Practice, 2 SoviET & E.
EUR. L. 10, 10 (Mar. 1991) (stating that the Russia's Decree 601 attempts to make
registration less burdensome by reducing the number of documents required to register
a joint stock company and sets mandatory deadlines for registration).
74. See Soviet Ventures, supra note 43, at 80 (claiming that during the late 1990's
the Russian Federation took the position that its laws prevailed over Soviet laws and
consequently, the Russian Federation began passing laws devised to accelerate the
transition to a market economy).
75. Soviet and Russian Company Laws, supra note 70, at 10.
76. REGULATIONS ON JOINT-STOCK COMPANIES, supra note 66, at art. 88, § 30.
77. Soviet and Russian Company Laws, supra note 70, at 10.
78. REGULATION ON JOINT-STOCK COMPANIES, supra note 66, at art. I, § 3.
79. Id. at art. I, § 1.
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vised to register first under Russian law, while simultaneously trying to
comply with Soviet law.8"
C. ONE HUNDRED PERCENT FOREIGN INVESTMENT
Yet another framework for foreign development in the Soviet oil in-
dustry is the one hundred percent foreign investment enterprise.81 This
is now possible under the Decree of the President of the U.S.S.R. on
Foreign Investment in the U.S.S.R. 2 The stated intent of the decree is
to attract foreign financial resources, technology, and management ex-
perience in the form of foreign investment.8 3 The decree provides that
profits earned in Soviet currency may be freely reinvested in the
U.S.S.R. or transferred abroad.84 Consistent with other laws on foreign
investment, the decree stipulates that the economic activity of Soviet
enterprises with foreign investment shall be determined by the legisla-
tion of both the U.S.S.R. and the individual republics? 5
80. See Soviet and Russian Company Laws, supra note 70, at 10 (noting that full
compliance with both laws may be impossible since the two laws may be impossible to
harmonize). Id.
81. See Soviet Ventures, supra note 43, at 78 (stating that President Gorbachev
promulgated this decree to attract further Western investment); see also A New Era
for Foreign Investment, supra note 30, at 2 (asserting that 100 percent foreign invest-
ment is favorable only for businesses that do not require major assets or are not highly
dependent on Soviet resources, or which offer a broad mix of products, thus seemingly
excluding the oil and gas industry).
82. Decree of the President of the USSR on Foreign Investment in the USSR,
(1990), reprinted in, 1 PARKER SCH. FOREIGN & COMP. L., U.S.S.R. Legal Materials
1 (V. Pechota & P. Pettibone 1991). See Soviet Ventures, supra note 43, at 78 (com-
menting that no implementing rules were issued, making the procedures for this type of
enterprise unknown) [hereinafter DECREE ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT]; see also A New
Era for Foreign Investment, supra note 30, at 1 (pointing out that a second decree
providing a new commercial exchange rate to be used in foreign trade was introduced
on the same day, and that these two decrees enhance the Soviet commitment to accel-
erate and encourage foreign investment).
83. DECREE ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT, supra note 82, preamble.
84. DECREE ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT, supra note 82, § 4. See A New Era for
Foreign Investment, supra note 30, at 2 (stating that this Decree permits foreign inves-
tors to invest ruble profits in other Soviet ventures).
85. DECREE ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT, supra note 82, § 1; see A New Era for
Foreign Investment, supra note 30, at 11 (arguing that the uncertainties which this
language produces are minimal due to the fact that most of the R.S.F.S.R. legislation
on foreign investment to date does not conflict with the laws of the U.S.S.R.); see also
Soviet Ventures, supra note 43, at 78-80 (indicating that although 100 percent foreign
investment is a viable option for potential foreign investors, there is no specific Soviet
legal regulation governing them).
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II. ASSERTIONS OF AUTONOMY
A significant barrier to investment in the Soviet oil industry is the
political instability arising from bids for autonomy by various national
groups.86 Because the oil industry is the largest source of hard currency
revenue,87 the central government considers control of oil reserves to be
vital to the Union.88 Due to the fact that over ninety percent of Soviet
oil production occurs in the Russian republic," the Russians have de-
manded control of, and revenues from, the exploitation of oil reserves
located on their territory.90 This battle for control of local oil reserves is
not limited to disputes between the Russian republic and the central
government. Smaller units, such as autonomous republics and territo-
ries, which are endowed with oil resources, assert similar rights.91
86. See Kovski, Soviet Potential Lingers Despite Current Upheaval, OIL AND
MONEY INT'L, May 13, 1991, at BI, B3 (quoting oil experts on the political tension
between the Central Government, the Ministry of Oil and Gas, and the regional pro-
duction associations) [hereinafter Soviet Potential]. Matthew Sagers, Director of En-
ergy Services at the Washington-based consulting company Plan-Econ Inc., neverthe-
less, contends that investment difficulties resulting from the battle between the central
government and the republics are of a transitional rather than a long term nature. Id.;
see also Soviet Oil Industry Woes, supra note 25, at 70 (referring to a report which
credits ethnic unrest in the republic of Azerbaijan, which produces 60% of all Soviet
oil equipment, for preventing the drilling of 1,500 Soviet wells due to a lack of
equipment).
87. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (describing the role of oil in the na-
tion's supply of hard currency).
88. See The Future of Soviet Oil, supra note 1, at 157 (explaining that the ambig-
uous nature of recent laws regarding the division of powers between the republics and
the central government, such as the draft Union Treaty of November 1990, indicates
that the central government wants to retain strong influence over energy exports).
89. Id. (citing Narkhoz SSSR, Narodnoye Khozyzystvo SSSR 1989 [National
Economy of the U.S.S.R. 1989], 1990, at 338); see Clearing Brush on the Soviet Oil
Frontier, supra note 18, at H5 (stating that 80 to 90% of known oil reserves are lo-
cated in the Russian republic).
90. See The Future of Soviet Oil, supra note 1, at 157 (pointing out that Russians
feel they get inadequate compensation under the present economic structure of the So-
viet Union).
91. See Moslems in Clash Over Rights to Oil, Fin. Times, Apr. 23, 1991, at 3
(reporting that thousands of Moslems in the republic of Tataria demonstrated for re-
gional autonomy and carried flags which read, "Tatar oil for Tataria"); see also The
Future of Soviet Oil, supra note 1, at 157 (stating that local assertions of control over
oil reserves occur most prevalently in Western Siberia where much of Soviet oil pro-
duction takes place). Moe contends that local entities consider direct dealings with for-
eign oil companies as a means of obtaining investment in their social infrastructure. Id.
at 158. See Cheeseright, Midlands Boost Soviet Region in Barter Deals, Fin. Times,
May 1, 1991, at 5 (reporting that in a barter deal between the British company
Orbicom and the Soviet company Neftekhimkombinat, based in the city of Tobolsk,
the Soviets are supplying a series of propane gas shipments in return for a maternity
hospital in Tobolsk and one million dollars worth of vehicles and parts for the city's
police force); Soviet Oil Industry Woes, supra note 25, at 68 (quoting the chairman of
the central council of the oil and gas production workers' trade unions as stating that
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Existing legislation concerning ownership does little to ease the situa-
tion.2 While asserting that natural resources are the inalienable prop-
erty of the peoples living on the given territory, 93 the Law on Owner-
ship in the U.S.S.R. grants possession and use of the land and natural
resources required to ensure the activity of U.S.S.R. organs of power
and management to the central government.9 4 Furthermore, this owner-
ship law designates the U.S.S.R. integrated power system as the prop-
erty of the central government."5
Western investors have anxiously awaited the enactment of a new
Union Treaty96 which they hope will define the economic and legal re-
lationship between the central government and the republics and, thus,
create a more stable environment for foreign investment. 7 A draft of
the new Union Treaty submitted to the republics for consideration,
however, fails to clarify whether the Union will maintain control over
the export of oil.98 Although the draft provides that the Union govern-
ment and the republics will jointly control "energy planning," a further
provision grants rights over land and resources to the republics.99
In addition, the draft fails to address the degree to which foreign
investors must continue to negotiate with the central government.100
While the Union and republics are accorded joint jurisdiction over the
creation of foreign economic policies, the Union retains exclusive power
to implement these policies.101 Thus, because the draft of the new
Union treaty does little to alleviate confusion for foreign investors,
Western companies are advised to consummate agreements with na-
the shortage of food for petroleum industry personnel working in the western Siberia
oil fields is creating an explosive situation).
92. LAW ON OWNERSHIP, supra note 69.
93. LAW ON OWNERSHIP, supra note 69, at art. 20, § 1.
94. LAW ON OWNERSHIP, supra note 69, at art. 20, § 2. See Hanson, Property
Rights in the New Phase of Reforms, 6 SOVIET ECON. 95, 103 (1990) (stating that
these two seemingly conflicting provisions are the result of a compromise between fed-
eral and republic claims and beg the question of what constitutes a necessary federal
function).
95. LAW ON OWNERSHIP, supra note 69, at art. 21.
96. See Murray, The Union Treaty: An Incentive to Invest?, 2 SOVIET & E. EUR.
L. 10, 10 (July 1991) (stating that Western investors have looked forward to the treaty
as a means of ending the war of laws between the central and republic governments).
97. Id. The draft of the Union Treaty, while embodying concepts which might en-
able the republics to operate independently in the world economy, fails to establish the
predictable legal environment essential to investors. Id. at 11.
98. See id. at 10-11 (noting the central government's grant of most powers over
resources to the republics and questioning whether it has also released control over oil
exports).





tional, regional, and local authorities0 2 in order to reduce the possibil-
ity of future problems.
III. OPERATIONAL CONCERNS
A. REGISTERING A JOINT OIL ENTERPRISE
All joint oil ventures in the Soviet Union are subject to registra-
tion.103 In order for a joint oil venture to register, the appropriate re-
gional Council of Ministers,'" through a governmental decree, must
approve enterprises with foreign participation.105 To obtain this decree,
the foreign and Soviet partners must first draft an agreement.106 Next,
the republican Council of Ministers who preside over the republic in
which the oil deposit is located must approve the agreement.10 7 Finally,
the agreement is conveyed to the state mining supervisory committees
and the Council of Ministers which approve and issue the decree.10 8
Once the decree is obtained, the joint venture can register with the
republic Ministry of Finance. 09 Registration requires a participant's
written application along with copies of the decree and the articles of
establishment." 0
102. See Turkmen Lease Terms Improved, Model Contract to Come, OIL & GAS
J., June 3, 1991, at 108 (reporting that the Turkmen republic, which is inviting bids for
Western investment in the republic's oil, received prior approval for the project from
the all-union petroleum ministries to alleviate concerns of western oil companies); see
also Clearing Brush on the Soviet Oil Frontier, supra note 18, at H5 (quoting the
international vice president of the Chamber of Commerce as stating that negotiating
multiple agreements with the Republics and the central government is the best insur-
ance policy).
103. Regulation No. 224 of November 24, 1987, on Registration of Joint Ventures,
International Associations and Organizations Established in the Territory of the
U.S.S.R. with the Participation of Soviet and Foreign Firms and Management Bodies,
(1987), art I., § 2, reprinted in 2 PARKER SCH. FOREIGN & COiP. L., USSR Legal
Materials [hereinafter Registration of Joint Ventures].
104. See KONST. SSSR (1988), chap. 17, art. 139, translated in GORDON B.
SMITH, SOVIET POLITICS: CONTINUITY AND CONTRADICTION, App. A (1988) (defining
the Council of Ministers at the regional, autonomous republic level as the highest exec-
utive and administrative organ of state power for the autonomous republic).
105. Western Business Opportunities, supra note 38, at 179-80. Requirements
under the original joint venture decree required approval by the U.S.S.R. Council of
Ministers; however, the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers eliminated
this requirement in order to ease the approval process for smaller joint ventures. Id.
106. Legal Framework for Oil and Gas Development, supra note 68, at 8. The
partners must establish this agreement with the advisor participation of either the Min-
istry of Oil and Gas or the Ministry of Geology. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 9.
110. Registration of Joint Ventures, supra note 103, § 5.
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B. SECURING TRANSPORT FACILITIES
Beyond political instability, there are several other matters of imme-
diate concern to entities pursuing investment opportunities in the Soviet
oil industry. For example, the Western investor must secure the neces-
sary transport system to enable oil exports."' Reliance on the Soviet
pipeline system could prove problematic because, in order to acquire
access to it, the investor must make agreements with several agen-
cies. 1 2 Furthermore, due to years of neglect, the pipeline network has
deteriorated to such a degree that the Soviets have sought the aid of
foreign contractors for its repair. 113 Construction of a pipeline system
by the foreign investor would require a prohibitive amount of capital.
Ethnic unrest likewise threatens to disrupt the flow of petroleum trans-
ported via pipelines across secessionist republics.1 5 Because many So-
viet ports are located on the Baltic and Black Seas, exporters may find
themselves dependent on cooperation from republics which are not di-
rectly benefitting from the oil venture. 11 6 Soviet legislation addresses
this issue in a generalized manner. For instance, a 1987 decree declares
that the ministries and departments of the central government, as well
as the governing bodies of the union republics, will cooperate to in-
crease the export of goods competitive on foreign markets. 1" 7 Despite
111. See Soviet Efforts to Attract Foreign E & P Investment, supra note 33, at
179 (questioning the use of the indigenous Soviet infrastructure to transport oil out of
the Soviet Union).
112. See id. (stating that, because the Soviet transport system is controlled by sev-
eral agencies, understanding the institutional workings of these agencies, as well as
obtaining the necessary permits from them, could require lengthy investigative work for
the Western company); see also Why Soviet Oil Wells Won't Be Gushing Soon, supra
note 45, at 36 (citing the uncertainty regarding who controls the Soviet pipeline system
as an impediment to investment by Western oil companies).
113. See Can Soviet Oil Save Gorbachev?, supra note 11, at 46 (stating that some
pipelines burst due to initial poor construction and lack of periodic inspection). Close
routing of gas pipelines in western Siberia, while less expensive, has left these lines
vulnerable to catastrophic accidents. Soviet Oil Industry Woes, supra note 25, at 70.
Furthermore, payment delays to Japanese metallurgical firms have temporarily stopped
deliveries of pipe to the Soviet Union. Soviet Union Oil Sector Outlook Grows Bleaker
Still, OIL & GAS J., Aug. 12, 1991, at 33.
114. Soviet Efforts to Attract Foreign E & P Investment, supra note 33, at 179.
115. See U.S. Joint Ventures, supra note 24, at 8 (stating that republics, oblasts,
and krais all claim transit rights to oil and gas pipelines).
116. See Declining Soviet Oil Exports Holding Up Better Than Some Experts Ex-
pected, OIL MARKET LISTENER, Apr. 25, 1991 at 1, 5 (reporting that a new oil export
terminal and port is being planned near Leningrad in the Russian republic in an effort
to ensure uninterrupted flow of oil to the West). Export of production from the Baltic
region is presently shipped primarily from Ventspils in the Latvian republic and Klai-
peda in Lithuania. Id.
117. Decree No. 1074 of September 17, 1987, on Additional Measures to Improve
the Country's External Economic Activity in the New Conditions of Economic Man-
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this decree, foreign companies may find it necessary to negotiate with
officials from other republics in order to guarantee a means of export.
C. PROCURING SUPPLIES FROM THE SOVIET MARKET
Another operational concern of the foreign investor relates to insur-
ing the procurement of needed supplies and equipment from the Soviet
market. 18 An investor who imports all materials required for an oil
drilling operation may have to expend large amounts of foreign cur-
rency, and face work stoppages due to delays in the arrival of im-
ports. 119 Therefore, the joint venture will probably rely on procuring at
least a portion of its operational materials from the Soviet market. 20
Additionally, integration of the joint venture into the Soviet economy
presents challenges. From a legal standpoint, Decree 49 declares that
the joint enterprise is independent of Soviet central planning. 121 This
legal provision may result in disadvantages for the joint venture.'22 For
example, because the Soviet Central Plan determines the allocation of
all domestic supplies, 23 the joint venture may find itself without needed
materials if the total supply of a particular product has been already
accounted for in the Plan.124 Thus, the oil venture should submit pro-
jected numbers of needed supplies and delivery timetables to the cen-
tral planners for coordination with the Central Plan. 125 Finally, joint
agement, reprinted in, 2 PARKER SCH. FOREIGN & COmip. L., USSR Legal Materials 5
(V. Pechota & P. Pettibone 1991).
118. See Note, The New Soviet Joint Venture Law, supra note 15, at 880 (empha-
sizing the importance of coordinating the joint venture with the Central Economic
Plan).
119. See infra notes 127-31 and accompanying text (explaining some of the
problems that result when businesses arrange joint ventures independent from Soviet
central planning); see also New Soviet Joint Venture Law, supra note 32, at 477 (stat-
ing that problems associated with integrating the joint venture with the Soviet economy
have a great impact on the profitability of the venture).
120. See Note, The New Soviet Joint Venture Law supra note 15, at 880.
121. DECREE 49, supra note 36, at art. III, § 23; see id. at art. III, § 26, (stating
that the joint venture should determine its procurement of supplies on the Soviet mar-
ket by agreement with the respective Soviet enterprises and organizations). Decree 49
significantly alters the previous provision of the joint venture legislation which asserted
that all domestic purchases by the joint venture must be effectuated through the appro-
priate Soviet foreign trade organization. See Western Business Opportunities, supra
note 38, at 187 n.129 (stating that, under prior joint venture laws, Soviet trade organi-
zations performed an intricate function); see also New Soviet Joint Venture Law,
supra note 32, at 477 (explaining that independence from the GOSPLAN is impossible
for the joint venture since the supplier and purchasers of the joint venture will have
production targets even if the enterprise itself has no equivalent requirement to meet).
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ventures should attempt to obtain an agreement from the Soviet Cen-
tral Plan limiting the number of government inspections and permitting
the enterprise to order supplies from outside the Soviet Union if the
Soviet products do not meet suitable quality standards. 28
D. TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
A top priority for the Soviet oil industry is obtaining Western tech-
nology in the area of oil production. 27 The United States, however, has
traditionally blocked the exportation of advanced technology to the So-
viets.128 For example, the 1979 Export Administration Act gives the
President of the United States broad discretion to restrict the export of
126. Id. at 187.
127. See Sansbury, U.S. Expertise Tops Soviet Union's Energy Shopping List, J.
OF COMMERCE & COMMERCIAL, Aug. 8, 1991, at 7B (reporting that Rantik Margulov,
the first deputy chairman of the state fuels and energy commission, ranked "know-
how" and expertise above equipment and hardware as the top priorities of the Soviet
energy sector); see also Gabrielyants, U.S.S.R. Offers Variety of Exploration Targets,
OIL & GAS J., June 3, 1991, at 71, 76 (stating that further growth of the Soviet petro-
leum industry is linked, in part, to manufacture of technical facilities for drilling, and
the development of technology to enhance oil recovery); U.S. Oil Service/Supply Firms
Urged to Venture into Joint Deals in U.S.S.R., Platt's Oilgram News, Apr. 1, 1991 at
6 (reporting that the Soviet Deputy Minister of Heavy Engineering told United States
executives that the "Soviet oil industry needs technology for horizontal drilling, corro-
sion prevention, high pressure drilling, casings, compressors, lifts, maintenance equip-
ment, and for production of heavy oil" and, therefore, the timing is appropriate for a
joint venture); The Future of Soviet Oil, supra note I, at 152 (citing a report by the
chief architect of the revised Soviet energy program asserting that, if the world's most
energy efficient technology could be utilized everywhere in the Soviet economy, energy
consumption could be reduced by one-third); Clearing Brush on the Soviet Oil Fron-
tiers, supra note 18, at H5 (quoting a United States oil consultant who asserts that the
Soviet oil industry is using 1950's technology); Maggs, Direct Contacts by Soviet Orga-
nizations in International Economic Relations in F.J.M. FELDBRUGGE (ed.), THE DIs-
TINCTIVENESS OF SOVIET LAW 194 (1987) (explaining that Soviet technical backward-
ness results primarily from a poor flow of information which is indicative of centralized
decision making). But see Gustafson, supra note 16, at 334 (asserting that the energy
sector generally does not require high technology and that only modest improvements
are necessary to advance the Soviet energy sector up to world standards).
128. See Note, The New Soviet Joint Venture Law, supra note 15, at 880 (citing
the United States Export Administration Act of 1979 and the United States' member-
ship in the Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM) as
creating a formidable barrier to United States-Soviet joint ventures because they im-
pose licensing requirements on the transfer of technical data); see also U.S. Delegation
to Visit Soviet Union, supra note 23, at 977 (citing the 1974 Byrd and Stevenson
amendments as limiting the ability of United States companies to sell their energy
related goods and services to the Soviet Union). But see Controls on Oil and Gas
Equipment to Soviets Ended, Other Foreign Policy Steps Extended, Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) No. 3, at 64 (Jan. 21, 1987) (reporting a January 15, 1987 announcement by
the Department of Commerce that it would lift restrictions on non-strategic oil and gas
equipment and technology exports to the Soviet Union).
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items deemed detrimental to United States security interests.1 29 In ad-
dition, the United States is a member of COCOM 13-a committee of
industrialized nations striving to prevent the export of goods which
could contribute to the military capability of communist nations.1 31
Although the United States Department of Commerce lifted export
restrictions to the Soviet Union on non-strategic oil and gas equipment
in 1987,132 a number of other advanced technology items continue to
require review by COCOM before they can be exported to the Soviet
Union.'33 The Bush administration, however, appears to be reevaluat-
ing its position on technology transfer to the Soviets. At the Moscow
summit in August 1991, President Bush reportedly agreed to review
COCOM rules restricting the sale of high technology goods to the So-
viet Union.13 4 Following the failed coup attempt of August 1991, a spe-
cial meeting of officials from the Group of Seven countries emphasized
their support for technical aid' 35 which would focus on food distribu-
tion, defense conversion, and energy.13 Finally, a pending United
States-Soviet agreement on energy was announced at an August 1991
meeting of Soviet and American energy officials. That agreement, if
passed, will formally allow government exchanges of technology
information. 137
129. Note, The New Soviet Joint Venture Law, supra note 15, at 888.
130. Bush Supports Rule Review for COCOM, J. oF COMMERCE, Aug. 6, 1991, at
3A [hereinafter Bush Supports Rule Review] (explaining that COCOM was estab-
lished in 1949 to prevent the export of high technology goods to communist nations).
131. Note, The New Soviet Joint Venture Law, supra note 15, at 888-89.
132. See id. at 890 (stating that the United States Secretary of Commerce de-
clared that controls on oil and gas equipment were no longer in the national interest of
the United States because such equipment is widely available on the open market).
133. See Auerbach, High-Tech Export Curbs to Be Reexamined: Administration
Rethinking COCOM After Coup Attempt, Wash. Post, Oct. 11, 1991 at F1 (explaining
that the Bush administration has begun to rethink export curbs on the sale of advanced
telecommunications equipment, computers and space satellites to the Soviet Union);
Devroy & Dobbs, Bush, Gorbachev Probe Terms of Partnership, Wash. Post, July 31,
1991, at Al (reporting that at the July 1991 United States-Soviet summit in Moscow,
former Soviet President Gorbachev criticized the United States' policies on the export
of technology as "a relic of the Cold War" and also asserted that Western barriers to
technological exchange had brought about the cancellation of major projects for eco-
nomic, technological and scientific cooperation).
134. Bush Supports Rule Review, supra note 130, at 3A.
135. See Hoffman, Baker Finds Soviets Eager for US. Technical Guidance, Wash.
Post, Sept. 16, 1991, at Al (reporting that, in the wake of the failed coup of August
1991, Secretary of State James Baker supported expanded technical aid to the Soviets,
rather than a massive aid program) [hereinafter Baker Finds Soviets Eager].
136. Auerbach, G-7 Says No Cash Now to Soviets, Wash. Post, Aug. 30, 1991, at
A29.
137. Ryan, Soviets Visit Area for Technological Aid, Dominion Post, Aug. 1,
1991, at IA [hereinafter Soviets Visit Area].
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E. PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
Apart from the barriers to technology transfer created by United
States policy, Soviet legislation provides little assurance that, once in-
side the Soviet Union, a foreign investor's intellectual property will be
protected.' 38 Inventions and "know-how" are listed in Decree 49 on
joint ventures as property rights which may be considered a contribu-
tion to the charter fund of a joint enterprise. 13 In addition, the joint
venture legislation states that intellectual property of the joint enter-
prise shall be protected according to Soviet legislation and that transfer
of property to a joint venture by its participants shall be governed by
the joint venture's charter. 4 ° The 1990 Agreement on Trade Relations
Between the United States and the Soviet Union includes provisions for
the protection of intellectual property.'" This is the same agreement
that grants Most Favored Nation trading status to the Soviet Union.' 4 2
As of September 1991, however, Senate approval of this agreement was
pending.' 3 Because legislation on the protection of intellectual prop-
erty rights offers no security for the foreign investor, Western and So-
viet partners must negotiate and document explicit provisions to govern
intellectual property investment. 44
F. LABOR ISSUES
Soviet labor issues represent a crucial area for negotiations. 41
Amended Decree 49 strengthened the position of foreign investors by
138. See Soviet Ventures, supra note 43, at 81 (explaining that joint venture par-
ticipants should not rely on the ambiguous language of current legislation to safeguard
their real and intellectual property rights).
139. DECREE 49, supra note 36, at art. III, § 11.
140. Id. § 17.
141. Agreement On Trade Relations Between the United States and the Soviet
Union, of June 1, 1990 (adoption pending), reprinted in, 1 PARKER SCH. FOREIGN &
COMP. L., USSR Legal Materials, at art. VIII (V. Pechota & P. Pettibone 1991). This
Agreement establishes that the two countries will: 1) ensure the protection and imple-
mentation of intellectual property rights in accordance with the provisions of internal
legislation; 2) ensure that each country's international commitment in the field of intel-
lectual property rights is honored; and 3) encourage arrangements between American
and Soviet institutions to provide protection for intellectual property rights. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.; see also A Month of Summits, EYE ON THE EAST, Aug. 2, 1991, at 2
(reporting that at the Moscow Stadium in July 1991, President Bush pledged to re-
quest Congress to approve MFN trading status) [hereinafter A Month of Summits].
144. Soviet Ventures, supra note 43, at 81.
145. See Note, The New Soviet Joint Venture Law, supra note 15, at 875 (stating
that, because labor is highly regulated by Soviet law, a Western investor may be pres-
sured to adapt to Soviet labor standards); see also supra notes 134-141 and accompa-




declaring that a joint venture may determine matters affecting Soviet
employees such as compensation 4 ' and dismissal,1 47 provided these acts
conform with U.S.S.R. legislation.148 Still in effect, however, is the re-
quirement that the administration of the joint enterprise conclude col-
lective contracts with relevant Soviet trade union organizations. 49
The Decree also requires a joint venture to pay for state social insur-
ance for Soviet and foreign workers.'5 0 Finally, although Decree 49 as-
serts that Soviet citizens shall make up the bulk of the joint enterprise's
personnel,15' it does not explicitly limit the permissible number of for-
eign employees. 52 Thus, it is important for the Western partner to ne-
gotiate for an agreement whereby the number of Westerners employed
will be determined by the foreign partner."5 3
146. See Note, The New Soviet Joint Venture Law, supra note 15, at 877 (stating
that Gorbachev has advanced a new incentive wage system as part of his domestic
economic reform policy, the purpose of which is to stimulate worker production and
professional improvement by introducing wage differentials for various levels of work
quality).
147. See Comment, Joint Venture Law in the Soviet Union: 1920s and 1980s, 9
N.W. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 633, 642 (1989) (stating that amendments to the joint ven-
tures decree which give ventures more independence illustrate the growing acceptance
of the need for foreign investment) [hereinafter Comment, Joint Venture Law].
148. DECREE 49, supra note 36, at art. VI, § 48; see Changing Legal Environment
in the U.S.S.R., supra note 28, at 17 (stating that clarification is needed regarding the
applicability of Soviet labor legislation to joint enterprises).
149. DECREE 49, supra note 36, at art. VI, § 47; see Note, The New Soviet Joint
Venture Law, supra note 15, at 878 (advising United States partners to investigate the
influence and functioning of the relevant trade union and to include the union in labor
negotiations in order to build a good rapport between management and labor and, thus,
to prevent potential disputes); see also Penn, Trade Union's Rights Widened in
U.S.S.R. Law, 2 SoviEr & E. EUR. L. 6, 11 (Mar. 1991) (warning that large-scale
work stoppages in the past few years, and the benefits that workers have gained as a
result thereof, illustrate the power of strikes as a negotiating instrument to which for-
eign investors are also exposed); see also The Future of Soviet Oil, supra note I, at
158 (reporting in a letter to the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers that 700.000 oil and gas
workers threatened to close down oil and gas wells on April 1, 1990 unless they were
assured of improved social conditions).
150. DECREE 49, supra note 36, at art. VI, § 48; see Comment, Joint Venture Law,
supra note 147, at 652 (stating that foreign citizens will probably not benefit from state
social insurance and no provision is made for repayment of the unused funds set aside
for foreign workers).
151. DECREE 49, supra note 36, at art. VI, § 47.
152. Western Business Opportunities, supra note 38, at 186; see Note, The New
Soviet Joint Venture Law, supra note 15, at 878-79 (citing Reform of Soviet Foreign
Economic Relations, Ecotass, No. 4, Jan. 19, 1987, at 25) (stating that one interpreta-
tion of this provision asserts that, among foreigners, the joint venture may employ only
a limited number of highly-skilled specialists); see also Comment, Joint Venture Law,
supra note 147, at 652 (asserting that Soviet trade unions could be difficult to deal with
because they will apply Soviet legislation to all employees, regardless of citizenship).
153. Note, The New Soviet Joint Venture Law, supra note 15, at 879.
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IV. FINANCIAL CONCERNS
A. TAXATION
Legislation on the taxation of foreign entities illustrates the constant
flux in Soviet law. 5" As of June 1991, four different taxes were levied
against the foreign investor:15 5 corporate income tax, repatriation of
profits tax, excess profits tax, and export tax. 1"e The Soviet corporate
income tax rate for joint ventures with more than thirty percent foreign
ownership is thirty percent;1 57 however, the Russian republic recently
announced a twenty-five percent corporate income tax rate for joint
ventures on its territory'"1 which are at least thirty percent foreign
owned. 5
In addition, a foreign company that transfers its profits abroad and
fails to reinvest them in the Soviet economy remains subject to a fifteen
percent repatriation of profits tax.1 60 The applicability of this tax to oil
ventures, however, is questionable because profits for most foreign firms
154. See Lloyd & Barber, Bush Stresses Need to Unleash Business Spirit, Fin.
Times, July 31, 1991, at 3 (reporting that the Moscow summit featured discussions of
a future bilateral tax treaty that would eliminate double taxation for United States
investors).
155. See Soviet Ventures, supra note 43, at 80 (explaining that current tax treat-
ment of foreign investment is more complicated than previous provisions); see also
Changing Legal Environment in the USSR, supra note 28, at 13 n.69 (explaining that
enterprises' transfer of five percent of their convertible currency assets to local and
regional executive committees, which Decree 1405 mandates, functions as an additional
tax on the enterprises' income).
156. See Soviet Ventures, supra note 43, at 80 (stating that, in 1987, the corporate
income tax and the repatriation of profits tax were the only two taxes levied against a
foreign entity). In 1990, two additional taxes were added, including an excess profits
tax and an export tax. Id.
157. Id. Corporate income tax on solely Soviet-owned entities is 45%. Id. In addi-
tion, joint enterprises are exempt from this tax for two years following the moment
they receive declared profits. DECREE 49, supra note 36, at art. IV, § 36; see Comment,
Joint Venture Law, supra note 147, at 651 (stating that joint ventures located in the
Soviet Far East receive a tax waiver for the first three years after the moment of de-
clared profits, but when this grace period expires, the corporate income tax rate is
10%).
158. Russian Republic Cuts Entity Tax Rate, Foreign Firm Tax Rate, Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) No. 24, at 909 (June 12, 1991); see id. at 910 (discussing a possible
accommodation between the U.S.S.R. and the Russian republic whereby entities which
formed under the all-union law file their taxes with the U.S.S.R., even if located in
Russia). Likewise, entities formed under Russian law that file their taxes with Russian
tax authorities are subject to Russian tax law. Id.
159. Id. The same decrees issued by the Russian Republic's Supreme Soviet also
set a 32% corporate income tax on joint stock companies, regardless of the amount of
foreign ownership, and a 25 % corporate income tax rate for wholly foreign owned joint
stock companies. Id.
160. Soviet Ventures, supra note 43, at 80. The previous rate for the repatriation of
profits tax was 20%. DECREE 49, supra note 36, at art. IV, § 41; see Soviet Efforts to
Attract Foreign E & P Investment, supra note 33, at 179 (declaring that British oil
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are derived solely from the export and subsequent sale of oil on West-
ern markets. 1'6 Thus, it appears that a foreign company's profits will
not be subject to the repatriation tax provided all profits for foreign
partners in oil ventures are derived outside of the Soviet Union. 62
Foreign investors are also subjected to an excess profits tax.163 An
enterprise must pay this tax once it surpasses certain profit norms'6
specific to the respective industry.""8 Under Soviet law, profits which
exceed this norm by ten percent or less are subject to an eighty percent
tax, while an enterprise which exceeds the norm by more than ten per-
cent is subject to a ninety percent excess profits tax."'6 In contrast, the
more lenient Russian law permits a fifty percent profit margin. Accord-
ingly, firms exceeding the profit norm by fifty percent or less are ex-
empt from excess profits tax, while those which surpass the norm by
more than fifty percent are subject to a seventy-five percent tax on ex-
cess profits. 167
Perhaps most indicative of the persistent legislative changes in the
Soviet oil industry, are changes in Soviet export tax rates. 68 In the first
half of 1991 alone, the Soviets amended the tax rate for oil exports
three times, 6 " each successive amendment bestowing greater advan-
tages to the foreign investor.-7 0 Although the lower rates serve as incen-
and gas firms, unlike United States companies, will be exempt from the repatriation of
profits tax due to their treaty status with the Soviet Union).
161. Id. at 179. The method for levying this tax against firms that choose to avoid
reinvestment in the Soviet Union remains questionable. Id.
162. Id. (explaining that it is not clear how the repatriation of profits tax will be
applied to enterprises opting not to reinvest their profits back into the U.S.S.R.).
163. See Soviet Ventures, supra note 43, at 80 (reporting that Soviet enterprises
with no foreign investment are subject to a 100% excess profits tax).
164. Id.; see RSFSR Asserts Autonomy in Tax Law, 2 SoviET & E. EUR. L. 6
(Feb. 1991) (stating that the U.S.S.R. government has not yet set profitability norms)
[hereinafter RSFSR Asserts Autonomy].
165. Soviet Ventures, supra note 43, at 80.
166. RSFSR Asserts Autonomy, supra note 164, at 6.
167. Id.; see Soviet Ventures, supra note 43, at 80 (mentioning that the RSFSR
excess profits tax is based on cost of production).
168. See Comment, Joint Venture Law, supra note 147, at 651 (asserting that, by
amending tax incentives, the Soviets indicate their willingness to change legislation ac-
cording to pragmatic concerns).
169. See Soviet Tax Maze, supra note 23, at 8 (reporting that, on January 20,
1991, Moscow announced that they would tax exports at a rate of 40%). In March
1991, a decree by the Council of Ministers reduced the rate to 10%. Id.; see also
Group of Seven Supports EC Plan For European Energy Market, J. OF COMMERCE &
COMMERCIAL, July 18, 1991, at IA [hereinafter Group of Seven] (stating that Moscow
had announced in mid-July that oil and gas export taxes would be lowered to three
percent). Moscow did this, apparently, in response to a 50% reduction in hard cur-
rency energy exports. Id.
170. See Soviet Ventures, supra note 43, at 80 (explaining that oil ventures that
depend on the export of oil for a return on investments were especially hard hit by the
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tives to Western investment,"" their longevity is questionable since ex-
port tax rates are subject to yearly adjustments.7 2
B. CURRENCY
All joint enterprises operating in the Soviet Union must secure the
necessary foreign currency to conduct business operations.1" Because
the Soviet ruble is non-convertible, a foreign partner's profits depend on
hard currency derived from the sale of Soviet products to the West.1
74
In fact, Decree 49 asserts that all of a joint venture's currency expendi-
tures must derive from the receipts of the enterprise's sale of products
on the foreign market. 5 While this legislative requirement poses diffi-
culties for ventures producing goods solely for sale on the Soviet mar-
ket, 1 76 it does not impede oil ventures to the extent their profits are
realized by the sale of oil on world markets.
Finally, a presidential decree of October 26, 1990 entitled On Intro-
ducing a Commercial Exchange Rate Between the Ruble and Foreign
Currencies and Taking Measures to Create a Unionwide Foreign-Cur-
rency Market, gave foreign enterprises the right to buy and sell foreign
currency for rubles at currency auctions and exchanges.' The Decree
further provided for the establishment of a commercial exchange rate
between the ruble and foreign currencies, adjusted by the U.S.S.R.
State Bank. 178 These provisions are important for oil ventures because
they enable foreign investors, whose profits are in hard currency, to pay
for Soviet labor in rubles.17
previous 40% export tax); see also Soviet Tax Maze, supra note 23, at 8 (stating that
Western oil company sources acknowledge that a continued 40% export tax would
prohibit nearly all foreign investment in Soviet oil).
171. See id. (observing that foreign investors may grow weary of even favorable
changes since they indicate an unstable framework upon which to negotiate).
172. Soviet Ventures, supra note 43, at 80.
173. See Western Business Opportunities, supra note 38, at 187-88 n.136 (stating
that enterprises need foreign currency to pay non-Soviet employees and to import prod-
ucts and technology).
174. Making Profits from Perestroika, supra note 33, at 326-27.
175. DECREE 49, supra note 36, at art. III, § 25.
176. See Soviet Decree on Forced Sale of Foreign Currency Does Not Affect For-
eign Capital, 1 SOVIET & E. EUR. L. 6 (Nov. 1990) (citing a presidential decree,
entered into force on November 2, 1990, that forces Soviet enterprises with no foreign
capital to sell to Vneshekonombank 40% of the hard currency they earn from exports).
177. Foreign Investment Conditions Improved, 42 Current Dig. Soviet Press No.
43, at 17 (1990).
178. Id. At the time of this Decree, the commercial exchange rate was set at 1.8
rubles to one United States dollar. Id.
179. Id. (declaring that the October 1990 decrees illustrate a lifting of restrictions
on an internal foreign currency market, a necessary prerequisite for switching to a




The August 1991 coup attempt by conservative forces immediately
altered the Soviet Union's political structures.18 The nation's economic
bureaucracy, however, has been slower to change. 81 In response to the
desperate state of the Soviet economy, the United States and other
Western nations made firm commitments to provide technical aid, but
declined to provide large amounts of monetary aid." 2
Reports that the Soviets may suffer from fuel shortages during the
winter of 1991-9218s reflect, in part, the inadequate condition of the
Soviet oil industry. Although forecasters predict that overall investment
by private companies and Western governments will continue to be
meager in the months following the coup,1 84 specialists assert that
Western companies may be willing to invest in the Soviet oil indus-
try.18 5 Western nations expressed their ihtent to offer economic assis-
tance to the Soviets prior to the August 1991 coup attempt. President
Gorbachev's unofficial meeting with leaders of the Group of Seven in-
that these recent decrees are indicative of the commitment of the Gorbachev govern-
ment to stimulate foreign investment); see also Foreign Firms Allowed to Open Ruble
Accounts in Soviet Banks, 2 SoviET & E. EuR. L. 7 (Mar. 1991) (stating that a
subsequent law, adopted in March 1991, permits foreign investors to open and main-
tain ruble accounts in authorized banks).
180. Dobbs, Soviets Transfer Power to Republics. Create New Transitional Gov-
ernment, Wash. Post, Sept. 6, 1991, at Al.
181. See Dobbs, Soviet Congress Balks at Plan to Revamp Union; Two Sides of
the Same Cup: So Many Changes-Or So Few, Wash. Post, Sept. 15, 1991, at Al
(remarking that, while the August 1991 coup attempt removed many of the political
barriers to economic reform, economic reform has scarcely begun); see also Baker
Finds Soviets Eager, supra note 135, at AI (referring to the statements on the part of
Soviet government officials that the political situation in the country remains volatile
and if government officials fail to provide more goods for Soviet citizens, the reform
process may be discredited).
182. See Baker Finds Soviets Eager, supra note 135, at AI (citing reports regard-
ing statements by Secretary of State Baker and that he remains convinced, even after
post-coup meetings with government leaders, that the most effective way to help the
Soviets is not by pouring large amounts of aid into the Soviet Union, but rather by
expanding technical assistance to the Soviets).
183. Hoffman, Soviet Reformers Ask Aid to Consolidate Democracy: Situation
Remains Dangerous, Baker Told, Wash. Post, Sept. 13, 1991, at A27.
184. Investment Dollars Unlikely to Flow to the U.S.S.R., Republics. Economists
Say, Int'l Trade Daily (BNA), at 1 (Sept. 3, 1991) [hereinafter Investment Dollars
Unlikely to Flow to the U.S.S.R.]; see Kissinger, Russian Minefield, Wash. Post, Sept.
17, 1991 at A19 (contending that assertions that the best way to aid the Soviet econ-
omy is by creating favorable conditions for foreign investment is a circular argument
because "the biggest obstacle to private investment is political chaos, which in turn is
fed by economic distress that seems unavoidable whatever the level of aid").
185. Id.; see Why Soviet Oil Wells Won't Be Gushing Soon, supra note 45, at 36
(stating that the failed coup bodes well for Western oil companies because it has re-
moved Soviet hard-liners from the scene and shifted power to the republics).
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dustrial nations at the London Economic Summit in July of 1991 re-
sulted in a commitment to offer technical aid in the area of energy
resource development. 186 The Group of Seven also endorsed the Euro-
pean Energy Charter, a plan initiated by the European Community
whereby Western capital and technology would be swapped for secure
supplies of Soviet oil and gas.18 This Charter will assist Western oil
companies by providing them with legal guarantees for their invest-
ments and by allowing repatriation of profits.' 88
A few weeks later at the Moscow summit, President Bush reaffirmed
his commitment to assist the Soviet energy sector by signing a protocol
that would transfer up to twenty million dollars in technical aid
targeted at, among other things, the oil industry.' 89 In addition, Senate
approval of the 1990 United States-Soviet trade agreement, which
would give the Soviets most favored trading status in exchange for pro-
visions that protect American commercial interests'9 " in the Soviet
Union, is scheduled for Fall of 1991.191
186. Dobbs & Frankel, Summit Leaders Agree to Provide Soviets With Technical
Assistance but No Money, Wash. Post, July 18, 1991, at Al; see Mufson & Hoffman,
West, Japan Cautious on Soviet Aid; Summit Leaders Cool to Gorbachev Letter,
Wash. Post, July 15, 1991, at Al (reporting that President Bush will present ideas on
how to improve exploitation of Soviet oil reserves rather than offer a broad program of
economic assistance); see also Soviets Visit Area, supra note 137, at I (reporting that
a meeting of United States and Soviet energy specialists in Morgantown, West Virginia
became the first sharing of technology under the London and Moscow summit
agreements).
187. Group of Seven, supra note 169, at IA. The Group of Seven's political com-
mitment to the European Energy Charter may expedite the signing of the Charter by
year end. Id.
188. Id.
189. A Month of Summits, supra note 143, at 2; see Barber & Lloyd, Bush Calls
for Baltic States' Independence and Deep Defence Cuts; Soviet Aid Linked to reforms,
Fin. Times, July 31, 1991, at 1 (reporting that President Bush promised to grant the
Soviets Most Favored Nation Trading Status); Soviet Energy Shopping List, supra
note 14, at 7B (citing a Soviet energy official as stating that Soviet exporters would
benefit from Most Favored Nation status). But see Barber & Lloyd, Bush Stresses
Need to Unleash Business Spirit, Fin. Times, July 31, 1991, at 3 (questioning the
value of Most Favored Nation status for the Soviet Union because about half of all
United States imports from the Soviet Union already enter duty free and, also, because
there is little that Americans want to buy from the Soviets).
190. See Auerbach, White House Urges Action on Soviet Trade Treaty, Wash.
Post, Sept. 12, 1991, at B 11 (stating that the trade agreement would facilitate Ameri-
can business activities in the Soviet Union, and provide strict controls against piracy of
American patented products).
191. Dewar, Senate Approves U.S.-Soviet Treaty; Dispute Resolved Over Mari-




Western governments, Western oil companies, and the Union and re-
publican governments of the Soviet Union should take steps to en-
courage additional and more expedient foreign investment in the Soviet
oil industry. First, because Western governments are faced with troub-
led domestic economies and are, thus, unable or unwilling to offer the
Soviets full-scale economic assistance, 19 2 these governments should fo-
cus their efforts on developing ways to encourage investment by private
oil companies."' They should play an active role in organizing and par-
ticipating in seminars and discussions between private oil companies
and Soviet officials at both the republic and the union levels. In July of
1991, for example, the United States Department of State sponsored
discussions between U.S. oil companies and research firms and Soviet
officials in Moscow that focused on overcoming the political, legal, and
economic obstacles to joint development of Soviet oil.' Additional
seminars are needed to expand communications between Western busi-
nesspeople and Soviet and republican officials, to address issues of con-
cern for potential investors. The various agencies of Western govern-
ments can play an instrumental role in bringing parties together" 5 and
instilling more confidence in the Western investor through official sup-
port of Soviet oil projects.
Apart from organizing discussions between the parties, Western gov-
ernments should provide consulting services for oil companies through
relevant agencies such as the United States Department of Commerce
and the United States Department of Energy. Such services should
compile lists of important Soviet contacts as well as provide informa-
tion on relevant treaties and legislative changes.
Western oil companies could also do more to advance their invest-
ment plans and insure profits from Soviet oil ventures. Because the So-
viet and Russian laws governing foreign investment are vague and un-
192. Investment Dollars Unlikely to Flow to the U.S.S.R., supra note 184, at A19.
193. See Why Soviet Oil Wells Won't Be Gushing Soon, supra note 45, at 38 (list-
ing ways in which the Bush Administration could encourage private investment in the
Soviet oil industry, such as signing tax agreements with Union and republican govern-
ments in order to eliminate the possibility of double taxation, emphasizing oil-related
issues during bilateral meetings, and projecting a more positive attitude toward private
investment in Soviet oil so that banks will be more willing to finance oil deals).
194. U.S.. Soviets Talking About Joint Oil Ventures, J. OF COMIMERCE, July 19,
1991, at 6B [hereinafter U.S., Soviets Talking].
195. See Javetski, Borros, Harbrecht, & Brady, Power Broker in Power Vacuum,
Bus. WK., Sept. 9, 1991, at 38 (remarking that United States ambassador to the Soviet
Union, Robert Strauss, plans to bolster American-Soviet business deals, especially in
the oil sector).
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clear, great care must be exercised to clearly detail all relevant legal
and business issues in the investment agreement. Doing so, will remove
much of the uncertainty from investment and reduce future
problems.198 In addition, Western oil companies should not allow the
political instability of the Soviet Union to hinder the progress of their
investment plans.19 7 While the shifting political situation might alter
the necessary agencies and officials with whom the foreign investor
must deal, the realities of the nation's economic situation make it un-
likely that political changes will adversely effect foreign investment.
This is particularly true for the Soviet oil industry because the nation's
primary source of hard currency derives from oil exports.
The Soviet and republican governments should also do more to facili-
tate foreign investment in the oil industry. First, these governments
should increase their awareness of the Western investor's needs. They
should meet with international business lawyers and consult analogous
Western investment contracts to ensure that all of the foreign com-
pany's concerns are addressed in the contract. Likewise, these govern-
ments should take similar measures to eliminate many of the ambigui-
ties from relevant legislation.
Perhaps most importantly, the Union and republican governments
must cooperate with each other to guarantee the rights of currently-
operating oil ventures. Cooperation would also serve to reassure those
foreign oil companies still negotiating that their investments will not
fall victim to lack of cooperation between Moscow and the republics,
and among the republics themselves. For example, because Soviet oil
equipment is produced exclusively in the republic of Azerbaijan, 98 the
Union government and the governments of various republics should
contract with the Azeris to exchange equipment for percentages of ei-
ther the oil produced or the revenue obtained. Similar agreements
should be forged between oil producing republics and those entities
which control the pipelines through which oil must be transported.
196. See A New Era for Foreign Investment, supra note 30, at I 1 (declaring that
companies who forge ahead with their investment plans will define the process of for-
eign investment for companies which follow).
197. See U.S., Soviets Talking, supra note 194, at 6B (reporting the comments of
first deputy minister of the Soviet Union's Ministry of Oil and Gas, who said that large
United States oil companies are too concerned with assessing the political risk of in-
vestment and that smaller companies have been more successful in consummating in-
vestment agreements).
198. See After the Soviet Union: Can the Dreams Overcome the Odds of Disaster?,
Bus. WK., Sept. 9, 1991 at 30 (reporting that a factory in Baku produces the nation's
entire supply of sucker-rod pumps used in the production of oil).
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CONCLUSION
Regardless of the prevailing political and economic structure, the So-
viet Union will continue to rely on the export of oil. The growing ills of
the domestic economy necessitate participation in the world economy
and, in turn, dependence on oil exports. Therefore, the Union and re-
publican governments will continue to adapt their legal and economic
conditions in order to provide a more hospitable environment for the
Western oil investor.
